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REGIONAL GEOGRAPHIC INFLUENCE
ON TWO KHMER POLITIES
By Chad Raymond*
This paper examines the effects of Cambodian geography in two
Khmer polities: Funan, an empire that occupied the southeastern portions of
modem-day Cambodia and Vietnam during the early centuries A.D., and
Democratic Kampuchea, a Cambodian state that existed from April 17, 1975,
until the Vietnamese invasion of December 25,1978. The terms "Cambodia"
and the altemative English transliteration "Kampuchea" refer to the modem
Southeast Asian state located between Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, while
•'Khmer" is used to denote the language, culture, and nation ofthe people who
are ruled by that state.
The territory of modem Cambodia can be thought of as a shallow
saucer with a broken rim on the lower right or southeast side.' The Cardamom
mountains along Cambodia's southwestem coast form a barrier with the ocean
while the Dangrek mountains along Cambodia's northem border separate the
country from the Khorat plateau of Thailand. Highlands are located in
Cambodia's extreme northeast. Most of Cambodia's interior is flat. The
Mekong river, which enters Cambodia from the north, traverses an alluvial
plain in Cambodia's southeast before entering Vietnam to eventually empty
into the South China Sea.
GEOGRAPHY AND MYTH OF FUNAN
Funan is the name applied by Chinese writers to the first historically
documented Khmer polity. Funan consisted of a network of commercial
centers that stretched from the Malay peninsula in the west to the Mekong
delta in the east during the first to the seventh centuries A.D.' Funan's
existence is known primarily from Chinese accounts written from the third to
the sixth centuries A.D. and from archeological studies. Archeologists have
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located brick walls, pottery, and precious metal artifacts in several locations
in southeastern Cambodia and in southem Vietnam. These discoveries, along
with a large canal network that is believed to have linked the ancient
settlement of Angkor Borei with more coastal settlement sites.' indicate a high
degree of political organization. The archeological evidence of Funan's scope
is supported by Chinese texts that describe Funan as a maritime empire with
settlements containing houses raised on stilts. According to these texts, the
people of Funan cultivated rice and sent missions to China with tribute of
gold, silver, ivory, and exotic animals.^ Buddhist artifacts were also
exchanged between Funan and the Liang dynasty of southem China.'
The Chinese texts also recount the mythological origins of Funan as
the land ofthe Khmer people. The earliest known account of this myth was
recorded by the Chinese official Kang Tai, who traveled to Funan in the
middle of the third century A.D. A tenth-century history of Kang Tai's
journey states that he leamed that the original sovereign of Funan was a
woman named Liu-ye. A man named Hun-tian - a Chinese transcription of
the name Kaundinya - from the land of Mo-fu dreamt that a god gave him a
bow and asked him to take to the sea. The next day, Hun-tian discovered a
bow in a temple devoted to the god, and he boarded a ship that sailed to
Funan. Liu-ye attempted to attack and plunder Hun-tian"s ship, but -'Hun-tian
raised his bow and shot an arrow which pierced through the queen's boat froni
one side to the other. The queen was overtaken by fear and submitted to him."
Hun-tian then ruled over the country of Funan.^ A similar account is
contained in the History ofthe Chin, compiled in the first half of the seventh
century A.D.^
The Chinese texts that refer to the Khmer foundation myth are
generally regarded as chronologically accurate, but they concentrate on
China's diplomatic and commercial relations, making them a discontinuous
and biased historical record;' however, Chinese accounts of the myth do
contain references to names found on stone inscriptions dated prior to 1000
A.D. An inscription dated 657 A.D. at the Champa site of Mi Son in Vietnam
describes a warrior named Kaundinya starting a dynasty with Soma, the
daughter of the king of the naga serpent gods."" The Baksei Chamkrong
inscription outside of Angkor Thom, dated 947 A.D., describes a dynastic line
originating from "from Sri-Kaundinya and the daughter of Soma.'*'"
Similar versions ofthe same myth also appear in modem Cambodian
folklore. One version states that a man named Preah Thaong arrived by ship
at an island marked by a giant thlok, a tree that is native to Cambodia. On the
island Preah Thaong discovered the subterranean home ofthe nagas, where
he met the king's daughter, NeangNeak, whom he married with her father's
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blessing. The couple returned to the land of men, and the naga king drained
waters surrounding the island, bestowing the name of Kampuca Thipdei upon
the new realm, a title that in Sanskrit means "'king of Kambuja"
(kambujadhipati).^^ Preah Thaong's wife was impregnated by the god Indra,
and she gave birth to a son named Ket Mala who assumed the throne and
established a dynasty. In some variants ofthe story, Preah Thaong encoun-
tered the naga princess on the shore ofthe ocean.
Another version of the myth from Cambodian folklore states that
Preah Thaong arrived at the land ofthe thlok tree only to find it under the rule
of a Cham king. Through trickery and war Preah Thaong overthrew the Cham
king and gained the throne. In some variations of this story, the Cham king
retreated to Champassak in modem-day Laos, where he gathered a Laotian
army and forced Preah Thaong to refreat. Preah Thaong then counter-attacked
at and besieged the Cham king. Through the intercession of Cham mandarins,
the Cham king agreed to divide his kingdom, and Preah Thaong was granted
"the place ofthe thlok tree.'"''
Royal Cambodian annals that date at least to the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries contain similar explanations for the origin ofthe Khmer.
One story in the annals identifies Preah Thaong as an exiled son of a foreign
king and credits him with defeating the native king who had ruled the land of
the thlok. Upon his victory, Preah Thaong married a naga princess, and the
king of the nagas created a kingdom called Kambuja for Preah Thaong by
swallowing the sea" A variation on this account, also found in the annals,
describes Kambu Svayambhuva, the king of a land called Aryadesa, who
wandered in sorrow through a land of sand and rock after the death of his
wife. Kambu stumbled upon a cave, entered it, and discovered the naga
underworld. Kambu married the daughter ofthe naga king, who tumed the
desert into a beautiful land that became known as Kambuja.'*
The Khmer origin myth is remarkably consistent over many sources
and time periods, and it reflects significant geographic influences on the early
Khmer polity of Funan. In the myth, a man traveling by sea indicates a coastal
area, and his arrival at a place inundated by water where serpent gods control
floods and fertility suggests that agriculture in this location depended on the
floodwaters brought by the annual monsoon. A complex society like Funan,
with its high population densities, ceramic and metallurgical technology, and
a hierarchical social structure, would have required food-surplus rice
agriculture.'- Van Liere believes that surplus food production first arose in
the region approximately two thousand years ago in the flood-prone alluvial
plains ofthe lower Mekong river, near the coast ofthe South China Sea, with
the use of broadcast rice. Rice production further inland to the north and west
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was avoided until the eighth century A.D. because ofthe effort required to
clear densely vegetated interior lowland forests."" Even today Cambodia's
zones of productive agriculture are restricted to lowland areas, where flooding
maintains soil fertility but makes careful control of water for bunded-field
irrigation difficult.'^
The ability ofthe Khmer between two thousand and fifteen hundred
years ago to produce a surplus of food in the alluvial plain ofthe Mekong
made it the most important location of early Khmer settlement and permitted
the development of a complex society like Funan. Inscriptions dated prior to
1,000 A.D. indeed indicate a concentration of Khmer in this area - "the
modem provinces of Takeo, Prei Veng. Kompong Speu, and Kampot, with an
extension northward along the Mekong through Kompong Cham as far as
Kratie.'""
Versions ofthe Khmer origin myth that discuss water covering the
land, the defeat of a Cham king, and the thlok tree point to a geographic factor
that has been important in more modem Khmer polities. The flat alluvial plain
of the Mekong extends to the ocean and contains numerous navigable
waterways. Hence the heartland of Funan coincidentally formed the route
used by foreign armies to repeatedly invade central and northwestem
Cambodia from approximately 1,000 A.D. until French colonization in the late
1800s. For example, in 1177 A.D. a Cham fleet sailed from the coast up the
Mekong to the northem shore ofthe Tonle Sap, defeated and executed the
Khmer king, and sacked Angkor.'" Following their obliteration ofthe Cham
empire in the seventeenth century, the Vietnamese began annexing Khmer
lands in the Mekong delta, a process which culminated in two occupations of
Phnom Penh by the Vietnamese in the first half of the nineteenth century.^^
The territory where the Khmer first developed surplus agricultural
production, an organized system of political authority,-' and trade relations
with other states was thus the same area most in danger of conquest by foreign
invaders. The frequency of foreign invasion along this route gave rise to the
belief among ordinary Khmers that they are constantly threatened by outsiders,
and that harmony between Khmers must be maintained if Khmer society is to
withstand foreign aggression.
Ordinary Khmer regard harmony in interpersonal relationships as the
primary means of avoiding conflict within society at large,-^ but the need for
harmony does not extend to what Edwards'^ labels the cultural "other."
Khmer political elites have often described the Khmer people "from the
outside in, manipulating negative imagery of what Cambodia is not . . . to
project an assumed image of what Cambodia is." The traditional conceptual-
ization of the non-Khmer as a threat has given Cambodian rulers the latitude
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to justify "policies designed mainly to perpetuate their own personal mle" as
"a dedication to national interests."^'' Simultaneously Cambodian rulers are
invested with the authority to defend the Khmer against hostile extemal forces,
making ordinary Khmer obligated to accede to the dictates oftheir rulers; to
do otherwise would be to act against the Khmer nation and for those who seek
to destroy it.
SOUTHEASTERN CAMBODIA IN DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA
The policies pursued by the leadership ofthe state of Democratic
Kampuchea (DK) between April 17,1975, and December 25,1978, have been
called an implementation of "Mao's plan with Stalin's methods," "racialist"
and "totalitarian."'^ and a "Utopian program of total and rapid social transfor-
mation."^'' The decision-making process that lay behind these policies is
obscure. Only approximately a dozen official DK policy documents written
by DK leaders are known to have survived, and no high-ranking figure has
written an official history ofthe regime or its leaders.
Pol Pot, leader of Democratic Kampuchea, declared in an April 1978
interview that the DK's objective was to create "a new culture based on
national traits, national tradition, and progressive qualities."^^ DK ideology
emphasized territoriality, sovereignty, and the protection ofthe Khmer nation
against the perceived ideological and physical aggression ofthe non-Khmer.
As Pol Pot said in August 1976,
[a]t the present time nothing captivates our attention as
much as the acts of invasion [or] violation of one's sover-
eignty . . . Both enemies, the West and the East, try to find
opportunities to attack us.'^
Making the Khmer nation capable of repelling threats from without
required a restructuring of Cambodian society from within. Cambodians thus
had to accept without question the state's absolute authority to ensure that the
revolution proceeded. Infiuences that were deemed alien by the DK
leadership were purged from the body politic, and forced labor became a tool
to produce "the rectification ofthe self and subordination ofthe individual into
a collective unit."^^ The revolution would by necessity also "defend,
strengthen, and enlarge" the DK regime itself.'"
ln the minds ofthe DK leadership, the DK's "capacity to defend the
country" against aggression could only be assured by "economic independ
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ence."" As detailed in the DK's Four Year Plan for 1977-1980 that was
drafted in the summer of 1976, the DK chose a strategy of rapidly transform-
ing peasant agriculture in order to overcome the country's weak industrial and
technological base. To create "plentiful agricultural capital" over the period
covered by the Plan, the Standing Committee ofthe Communist Party of
Kampuchea (CPK) expected the Cambodia's average rice yield to increase to
3 metric tons per hectare by the beginning of 1977 and the country's rice
production to double between 1977 and 1980. This represented an immediate
doubling of the country's average rice yield/' DK leaders believed that
"gaining mastery" over the "water problem" was critical to increasing
agricultural production, and hunci jds of thousands of Cambodians spent the
DK period digging ditches and building dikes in water control construction
projects." Foreign economic assistance was not needed to improve agricul-
tural yields, DK leaders believ. d. because ofthe special characteristics ofthe
Cambodian revolution, nor waj it wanted because of its political dangers.
As noted by Chandler et a!.,'' the Northwest Zone, composed of
portions of Battambang and Pursat provinces north and west ofthe Tonle Sap,
was singled out in the Four Year Plan as the area slated for the greatest
expansion of agricultural production. The DK leadership expected 140,000
hectares of previously uncultivated land in the Northwest Zone to produce 3
tons of rice per hectare by 1980. a target that would enable the Northwest to
provide 60 percent of Cambodia's rice exports. While other areas of
Cambodia were expected to supply 20 percent of the export value of their
harvests to the central authorities, the Northwest was ordered to tum over 50
percent of its harvests by value.
The province of Battambang in the Northwest Zone had in fact been
the most agriculturally productive region of Cambodia since colonization by
the French in the nineteenth century. In terms of population, when the DK
came to power in 1975, the Northwest also enjoyed higher land per capita and
rice production per capita ratios than the more densely populated East Zone
(composed of parts of the provinces of Prey Veng. Svay Rieng, Kompong
Cham, and Kratie) and Southwest Zone (portions of Kampot, Kompong Speu,
Takeo', and Kandal provinces).^' The East and the Southwest Zones contained
the provinces located on the alluvial plain ofthe Mekong watershed.
The problem facing DK leaders was to increase rice production and
yields in the Northwest Zone without a ready supply chemical fertilizers,
agricultural machinery, or other capital-intensive inputs. DK leaders
implemented an ingenious if brutal solution to the problem: sending
additional labor to the Northwest Zone by relocating not only many of
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Cambodia's million-plus urban residents but also people from rural southeast-
em Cambodia.
The forced relocation of large numbers of people from southeastem
Cambodia not only increased the amount of labor available in the Northwest
Zone, but it also served the DK's wider ideological agenda. Pre-1975
Cambodian society had to be overtumed. class enemies had to be destroyed,
and the DK's hold on power had to be solidified. Ordinary Cambodians had
to "'build and defend Cambodia" while "standing guard against widespread but
poorly defined enemies who threatened the Organization [the CPK] and its
revolution."^'' Southeastem Cambodia, especially the provinces located in the
East Zone, was the area of Cambodia believed by DK leaders to be most in
danger of foreign aggression. DK leaders believed that the area contained the
greatest numbers of civilians and CPK members whose commitment to the
DK - and thus to the Khmer nation - were suspect. These individuals had to
be removed from southeastem Cambodia - in one way or another - for
security reasons. Notably the first DK district administration in the East Zone
brought under greater control by the central DK leadership was Chantrea in
1975-76. Chantrea is the only area of Svay Rieng province and the East Zone
surrounded on three sides by the territory of Vietnam.^ ^
According to Kieman, 800,000 people were relocated under the
orders ofthe DK leadership to the Northwest Zone between April 1975 and
the middle of mid-1976.'* The majority of those moved to the Northwest seem
to be civilians from the Southwest and East Zones - Cambodia's southeastem-
most provinces. Included in these evacuees was a large group of Chams from
the East Zone. Chams, being non-Khmer, were, by the DK's definition,
enemies and as Kieman'^ has argued convincingly, the victims of genocide
under the DK.
Vickery/" in contrast, argues against the view that "'the Chams were
as a group a special object of extermination policy" and that evidence indicates
that "there was never a central policy to destroy them . . . they were not the
object of any special attention by the authorities and that they survived in the
same proportion as other people." The death rate of Chams under the DK
does not alter the fact that Chams were deliberately relocated away from the
East early in the regime on the orders of the central DK leadership - against
the wishes of DK cadres in the North and Northwest Zone. An official
telegram to Pol Pot on 30 November 1975 states:
According to the fmal decision of the meeting [between
regional and district authorities in the Eastem Zone], we
must not send the Islamic People [the Chams] to Kracheh
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[Kratie] Province [in Cambodia's southeast]. The North-
west and the North [Zones] have to accept them, so that we
can keep them away from the Mekong River to help ease the
atmosphere ... In principle, the Zone withdrew fifty thou-
sand people to the North. More than one hundred thousand
additional Islamic people remain in the Eastem Zone . . .
But we will not have enough people to reach the one
hundred fifty thousa id [slated for relocation out of the
Eastem Zone], if the Northem Zone will not accept the
Islamic people.'"
Although executions on a mass scale did not begin in the East until
1978. East Zone cadres apparently began to be arrested as early as 1975, and
by 1976 cadres from the SOL 'hwest Zone had begun a implement a centrally-
directed plan "to sweep alt Eistem cadres out ofthe system."^^ The decision
to "purify" the East was thus a decision reached before the beginning of
execution campaign of 1978.
Heightening fears among DK leaders that southeastem Cambodia
might fall victim to foreign invasion were increasingly frequent military
clashes with Vietnam. Vietnamese forces had penetrated more than 20 miles
into Cambodian territory in 1977, and residents ofthe East Zone retreated into
Vietnam as its army pulled back. For this event to occur, the DK leadership
believed, the area had to be rife with traitors, and these traitors had to be
eliminated if the border was to be secured. If traitors were not exposed and
defeated by the DK, they would eventually "rot society, rot the Party, and rot
the army,"^' leading to the destruction ofthe Khmer.
The killing campaign instituted by the DK in the East Zone in 1978
targeted all remaining East Zone cadres, urban evacuees, and in particular
anyone in the Zone believed to be ethnic Vietnamese or a supporter of
Vietnam - anyone labeled as having a "Khmer body but a Vietnamese mind."
During the 1978 purge between 100.000 and 250,000 men, women, and
children from the East Zone were killed.'*''
The importance placed by DK leaders on "purifying" southeastem
Cambodia near Vietnam rather than Cambodia's northwestem interior is
further demonstrated by the pattem of mass graves that have been mapped by
researchers participating in the Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) at Yale
University. In Cambodia's southeastem provinces {Kompong Cham,
Kompong Speu, Kampot, Kandal. Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, Takeo, and the city
of Phnom Penh) - the provinces that occupy the flat alluvial plain of the
Mekong-approximately 12.000 mass gravesites were identified, composing
142
Chad Raymond/Regional (jeographic Influence on Two Khmer Polities
almost two-thirds of all mass grave sites that had been located in Cambodia
by July of 2001. Although the precise number of people killed at these
locations is unknown, evidence indicates that these are In fact "mass" graves
filled with the bodies of people executed by the Khmer Rouge.
At most ofthe sites containing mass graves, CGP research-
ers also identified Khmer Rouge-era prison facilities at or
near the mass grave site. This fact, along with witness
testimony and records ofthe Khmer Rouge security services
obtained by the CGP, leads us to conclude that most mass
graves hold the remains of victims of centrally-organized
violence, rather than of other causes of death such as
disease or starvation.''-
For example, documents record that 94,000 people were killed at a single site
in Svay Rieng province.''^
Northwest Cambodia presents a different picture. In the six
provinces surrounding the Tonle Sap (Siem Riep, Battambang, Pursat,
Kompong Chhnang, and Kompong Thom) - a region that includes the
heartland of the former Angkorian empire and the productive rice fields of
Battambang, nearly 5,200 mass grave sites were located by July of 2001 - less
than half the number found during the same period in southeastem Cambodia.
The geographic distribution of death under the DK regime is heavily skewed
toward Cambodia's southeastem provinces, as shown in Figure 1.
DK-era Mass Grave Sites in Cambodia
Source: (UabcxHmi Gcatdit frofosX.
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While Khmers inside Cambodia who were perceived as traitors were
being eliminated, ethnic Khmers who lived on the other side of Cambodia's
southeastem border were brought under DK rule to bolster national defenses.
Officials from the Southwest Zone were told by their superiors in 1977 that
"the Khmer Krom [ethnic Khmer living in southem Vietnam] were to be
brought to live in Cambodia while [Cambodian] Khmer were to be sent to live
in Kampuchea Krom," in part ti. gain "many forces'" to fight Vietnam.""^  In
1978, Southwest military units oegan launching raids across the border into
Vietnam to forcibly drive ethnic Khmers into southeastem Cambodia;
however, once inside Cambodia the Khmer Krom had to endure the same
"tempering" - forced labor, poKi.cal indoctrination, and in some cases torture
and execution - as native Cambodians to prove their loyalty as "tme" Khmers.
CONCLUSION
The construction of a national identity is usually assumed to have
three prerequisites. The first prerequisite is a belief shared by a large group
of individuals that each member ofthe group belongs to a community that is
distinct from and bordered by other communities. According to Anderson/
the nation is an "Imagined community" in the minds of its members whose
boundaries, while superseding the individual's immediate environment, are
fmite. While individual members ofthe community need not be identical in
terms of class, religion, or even language, they feel a bond with other members
of the community and therefore want "to act in unison on all matters of
national importance.""^
The second prerequisite is the belief by members ofthe community
that the community should be govemed by a sovereign state, and that the
defense of this sovereignty legitimizes the use of power by the leaders of that
state. Sovereignty links the shared belief in the community to the commu-
nity's most important political institution - the state - and prescribes some of
the necessary duties of that state and those who manage it. The belief in
sovereignty grants the state's leaders the authority to act upon the nation as a
whole in the name of national interests.
This paper has focused on the third prerequisite for the construction
of a national identity: the existence of a tradition of a territory that the
community regards as its ancestral home. The tradition of a territory provides
a chronological anchor for the supposed authentic and pristine origins ofthe
nation. The tradition also bolsters a nation's;
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political claim to a specified area of land and its resources,
often in the teeth ofopposition from rival claimants. From
this perspective, the homeland is indispensable for eco-
nomic well-being and physical security; and the exploitation
of its agricultural and mineral resources becomes a prime
nationalist consideration.^°
Nationality is thus a product not just of culture and history, but also
of geography. Geography is central to national identity, and while geography
is not destiny, "it comes awfully close to being s o . . . tradition can be invented
[but] it cannot be invented out of nothing."" In the case ofthe Khmer, the
geography ofthe lower Mekong river watershed - an unforested alluvial plain
that is flooded annually by monsoon rains - made possible the development
of food-surplus rice agriculture. Surplus agricultural production in tum
permitted the Khmer to form their first highly-organized polity, the empire of
Funan. The importance ofthe region once occupied by Funan to Khmer
concepts of nationhood is demonstrated by the mythical account ofthe origin
ofthe Khmer people. Though the historical accuracy ofthe myth of a foreign
man marrying a native princess and establishing a dynasty over the land now
known to Khmer as Kampuchea is impossible to verify, the Khmer have
believed in it for over fifteen hundred years. When people believe in myths,
the myths themselves become reality to the people who believe in them, and
"people act, or even base their lives upon them, especially in times of crisis.""
The crisis that put the Khmer nation most recently at risk was the
regime of Democratic Kampuchea. It has been estimated that within only
forty-four months the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea caused the deaths of
between 9 and 20 percent ofthe Cambodian population." Cambodia has still
not recovered socially, economically, or politically from the trauma inflicted
by Democratic Kampuchea. The area of Cambodia subjected to the most
brutality during the DK regime was its southeastem provinces, especially
those bordering Viemam, an historical enemy ofthe Khmer. In the minds of
DK leaders, the past use ofthe plains of southeastem Cambodia as an invasion
route by foreign aggressors required that the region be purified of anyone
disloyal to the Khmer nation or unsupportive ofthe DK's authority over it.
The DK leadership's preoccupation with defending southeastem Cambodia
from supposed enemies led to precisely what it feared most - an invasion by
the Vietnamese on December 25, 1978. The govemment of Democratic
Kampuchea fell within days and Vietnam occupied Cambodia for over a
decade.
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In the years after Democratic Kampuchea had fallen to Vietnam,
Cambodia's southeastem lowlands remained important in definitions ofthe
Khmer national interest. For example, following elections sponsored by the
United Nations in 1993, Prince Norodom Chakrapong. a son of Cambodia's
king Norodom Sihanouk, declared that an "autonomous region" would be
formed out of provinces adjacent to the Mekong River, such as Svay Rieng,
Kompong Cham, Prey Veng, Kratie, Stung Treng. Chakrapong's statement
was intended to force the winning party in the election, led by a rival son of
the king, to accept a coalition govemment with the political party that had
mled Cambodia before the election. The ploy worked - faced with the
potential secession of much of southeastem Cambodia and not wanting to be
regarded as responsible for a division ofthe Khmer people into two states, the
winning party agreed to share power. In the era of globalization when national
territories and borders are supposedly becoming increasingly irrelevant, the
geography of Cambodia remains important in Khmer politics.
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